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Disorder and scattering in photonic systems have long been considered a nuisance that should be 
circumvented. Recently, disorder has been harnessed for a rapidly growing number of applications, 
including imaging, sensing and spectroscopy. The chaotic dynamics and extreme sensitivity to 
external perturbations make random media particularly well-suited for optical cryptography. 
However, using random media for distribution of secret keys between remote users still remains 
challenging, since it requires the users have access to the same scattering system. Here we utilize 
random mode mixing in multimode fibres to generate and distribute keys simultaneously. Fast 
fluctuations in the fibre mode mixing provide the source of randomness for the key generation, and 
optical reciprocity guarantees that the keys at the two ends of the fibre are identical.  We 
experimentally demonstrate the scheme using classical light and off-the-shelf components, opening 
the door for cost-effective key establishment at the physical-layer of fibre-optic networks.   
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1. Introduction 
Complex photonic systems, such as scattering media, chaotic cavities, aperiodic photonic crystals and 
biological tissue, are comprised of a large number of spatial, spectral, temporal and polarization degrees 
of freedom. The strong coupling of these degrees of freedom provides exceptional opportunities for 
numerous applications, e.g., the spatial-temporal coupling was utilized for dynamic light scattering and 
diffusive wave spectroscopy
1,2
, the spatial-spectral coupling  for spectroscopy
3
 and imaging
4,5
, and the 
spatial-polarization coupling for polarimetry
6
. For optical cryptography, complex random media has been 
utilized for several cryptographic tasks, including authentication
7,8
, identification
9
, encryption
10
, random 
number generation
11,12
, and secure key storage
13
.  An optical fibre that supports hundreds or thousands of 
guided modes can also be considered as a complex photonic system. Random mode mixing arises 
naturally due to local index inhomogeneities and cross section variations, producing speckle patterns at 
the output of the fibre. Since the mixing depends on ambient temperature fluctuations and mechanical 
strains
14
, the output speckle pattern is extremely sensitive to environmental perturbations and therefore 
constantly changes in time. This poses a serious challenge for many applications such as 
telecommunication and imaging, as the transmitted information quickly gets scrambled. Here, we take 
advantage of the random chaotic fluctuations in a long multimode fibre to generate random keys. Most 
importantly, the remote users at the two ends of the fibre can share identical copies of the keys, by virtue 
of the optical reciprocity principle. The keys, which are constantly updated due to intrinsic fluctuations of 
the fibre, can then be used to encode and decode the information being sent over a standard unsecure 
communication channel.  
 
Our method of distributing keys at the physical-layer of communication networks can only be hacked in 
real-time, in contrast to the computational keys that are widely used in today’s telecommunications. 
Compared to the quantum key distribution (QKD), our scheme uses classical light and off-the-shelf fibre 
components, and is therefore much simpler and can be easily integrated with current communication 
networks. While other classical key distribution approaches, e.g., the ones using chaotic lasers
15
, require a 
precise tuning of the system parameters, ours is alignment-free and naturally robust, making it especially 
attractive for real-world applications.  Recently, several key distribution methods based on single mode 
fibres have been developed
16,17
, however, they are prone to eavesdropping because of the simplicity of the 
single mode fibre. In our approach, the complexity of a multimode fibre forces an adversary to 
simultaneously measure all fibre modes to extract information, and the measurements must be done 
quickly to track the rapid fluctuations of the fibre. The additional noise introduced by such exhaustive 
measurements sets the security of the key.  
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2. Proof of principle demonstration 
Let us consider two users, Alice and Bob, who simultaneously couple laser light of identical frequency 
into both ends of a multimode fibre (Fig. 1). As an example, we assume the input beam from Alice (Bob) 
has a well-defined wavevector  ⃗   ( ⃗   . In the presence of strong mode mixing, by the time the light exits 
the fibre all the guided modes are excited. Thus, at the far-field of the output facet a speckle pattern 
emerges, with no trace of the input wavevector [Fig. 1(a)]. The patterns Alice and Bob observe result 
from exactly the same mode mixing and phase shifts across the fibre, but in a reversed order. Since the 
order of the coupling events is not interchangeable, the output patterns at the opposite ends are different 
even when the input channels of Alice and Bob are the same ( ⃗    ⃗   .  Nevertheless, there is a unique 
pair of output channels that will be perfectly correlated. Optical reciprocity guarantees that the intensity 
measured by Alice at the output channel  ⃗   , is identical to the intensity measured by Bob in the output 
channel   ⃗   [Fig. 1(b)].  Remarkably, not only does this hold even when the two input channels are not 
identical ( ⃗   ⃗  , but Alice and Bob do not need to know which channel the other user couples light 
into at the opposite end of the fibre. All they need to do is measure the output intensity from the same 
channel that they have coupled light into.  As the environmental conditions of the fibre change, the 
speckle patterns and the intensities measured in the   ⃗  and   ⃗  channels will fluctuate. However, since 
reciprocity holds for any configuration of the fibre, the intensities measured in the   ⃗  and   ⃗  channels 
will remain perfectly correlated [Fig. 1(c)], as long as the fibre remains static during the time it takes the 
light to traverse the it. This is demonstrated experimentally in Fig. 1(d). Since the input and output 
channels are specified not only by the wavevector, but also by the polarization, we have placed linear 
polarizers at both ends of the fibre. Note, however, that the two polarizers do not need to select the same 
polarization state, but can be oriented at any arbitrary angle. To emulate changes in the environmental 
conditions of long fibres, the fibre was constantly shaken while speckle patterns were recorded. The 
synchronized fluctuations of the intensities measured by Alice and Bob allow them to share a common 
random signal from which they can extract a key.  
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Figure 1. A proof of principle demonstration of classical key establishment with a multimode fibre. (a) Alice and Bob 
couple a laser beam to the multimode fibre with wavevectors  ⃗   and  ⃗   respectively. Due to mode mixing in the fibre, 
speckle patterns appear at the output. The fibre is not perfectly symmetric with respect to its centre, therefore Alice and 
Bob measure two different patterns. (b) According to the optical reciprocity theorem, when the positions of a detector and 
a source are interchanged, the intensity measured by the detector in the two different configurations (IA and IB) is 
identical. Thus, at the channels that correspond to - ⃗   and - ⃗  , Alice and Bob measure exactly the same intensity. (c) Due 
to changes in the environmental conditions of the fibre, the output speckles constantly fluctuate. Nevertheless, at channel -
 ⃗   (blue circle) and - ⃗   (green circle) the intensity is always correlated, as verified experimentally in (d) with a 6-meter 
long step-index fibre (core diameter = 105 m, numerical aperture = 0.22) that supports         guided modes. The 
probe laser wavelength is  = 640 nm.   
 
While the above demonstration is performed in the wavevector (k) space, the reciprocity principle is not 
restricted to the wavevector space, and Alice and Bob can use channels in other spaces, e.g., the guided-
mode space or the position space. Moreover, either of them can use channels in a different space, without 
knowing which space is used by the other. The position space is convenient for fibre-network 
applications, because Alice and Bob can simply couple light to each end of the multimode fibre via single 
mode fibres. The single mode fibres, together with an in-line fibre polarizer, automatically guarantee that 
the illumination and detection are conducted in the same channels, enabling an all-fibre, alignment-free 
configuration which is compatible with optical fibre networks. Furthermore, in contrast to QKD, our 
method does not have to operate at the single photon level and can easily be implemented using standard 
telecommunication lasers. Figure 2(a) is a schematic of an all-fibre set-up we built with off-the-shelf 
elements. Using this setup, we demonstrated that, the intensities measured by Alice and Bob exhibit a 
correlation of 0.99 [Fig. 2(b)]. Such a high degree of correlation allows digitization of the analogue 
signal, by associating a bit value ‘1’ to all the intensities above the median, and ‘0’ to all the intensities 
below the median. After digitization, the correlation between the stream of bits Alice and Bob obtain is 
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0.90, and the bit error rate is 0.05 [Fig. 2(c)], which can be further reduced with error correction 
protocols
18
. The key rate is determined by the rate of the fibre fluctuations, which in our case was only 20 
Hz, since we perturbed just 5 meters out of a 1 km long fibre. However, the reported fluctuation rates of 
long-haul fibres in optical networks are much higher, typically in the range of 1-100 KHz
19,20
, enabling 
high key generation rates. The key rates can be further increased via parallelization, for example using 
wavelength division multiplexing (WDM).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Telecommunication compatible implementation of remote key distribution. a) Each node contains a laser 
source, a photodetector, a 2x2 splitter (S) and an in-line fibre polarizer (P). In our experiment a single laser source 
operating at the telecommunication C-band (λ=1550nm) is used with a splitter (not shown) to mimic two sources at both 
ends of the fibre. The laser light is coupled to the multimode fibre (black) via a single mode fibre (orange) to ensure that 
the illumination and detection channels are identical at either end of the fibre. The multimode fibre is a 1 km long graded-
index fibre with a core diameter of 62.5 m, supporting about      guided modes. The environmental changes on the 
fibre are induced by shaking a 5-meter portion of the fibre (out of the 1 km spool). (b) Scatter plot of the intensity 
measured by Alice versus the intensity measured by Bob, exhibiting a correlation of 0.99 (blue dots). To verify that the 
high level of correlation does not result from fluctuations in the total transmitted light, we added a free space beam slitter 
between the single mode fibre and the multimode fibre at Bob’s end (not shown), and measured the intensity at an 
arbitrary position across the beam, yielding a correlation of 0.01 (red dots). (c) A fraction of the digitized key, showing a 
raw bit rate of 20 Hz, and a bit error rate of 0.05. 
 
3. Eavesdropping and security analysis 
Next we analyse possible attacks by an eavesdropper, Eve. The attacks fall under two categories, passive 
ones where Eve only probes the light that is transmitted between the users, and active ones where Eve can 
also inject light into the system and use additional modulators to deceive Alice and Bob. In this section 
we focus on passive attacks and briefly discuss active attacks at the end. We specifically consider the so-
called beamsplitter attack, in which Eve places a beamsplitter at some intermediate point along the fibre.  
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Eve can then measure the speckle intensity patterns incident at the beamsplitter, travelling from Alice to 
Bob and from Bob to Alice [Fig. 3(a)].  These two patterns are uncorrelated since they have travelled 
through two different sections of the multimode fibre and experienced different mode mixing. Hence, 
none of the spatial channels measured by Eve will be correlated with the signals Alice and Bob measure.  
We experimentally emulated a beamsplitter attack and confirmed that the intensities in all the channels 
measured by Eve are uncorrelated with the intensity measured by Alice and Bob [Fig. 3(b)]. Note that, as 
in any cryptographic system, we assume the nodes of Alice and Bob are in a secure area which Eve 
cannot access. Alice and Bob can therefore make sure that the sufficient mode mixing is introduced to the 
portion of the multimode fibre within the secure area so that when the light exits the secure area, all 
channels are excited and the intensity measured by Eve in any channel will be uncorrelated with the 
signal sent by Alice and Bob.  
 
The random mode mixing along the fibre prevents Eve from extracting the key via direct intensity 
measurements. However, a beamsplitter attack provides Eve access not only to the amplitude, but also to 
the phase of the counter-propagating fields. Even in the presence of strong mode mixing, the complex 
fields at the output port of Eve’s beamsplitter carry information about the key. To illustrate this, let us 
denote the complex field distribution at the output port of Eve’s beamsplitter from Alice by         , 
where p = H,V denotes the polarization state. Since at a single frequency phase conjugation corresponds 
to the time-reversal operation, a complex conjugate field    
       will send the light back to Alice’s 
channel.  Thus the projection of    
       onto field distribution that Eve measures at the output port 
from Bob         , gives the fraction of the light that actually reaches Alice’s channel. Hence, Eve can 
extract the key by computing the complex overlap of the field distributions:  
 
  |∑ ∬                        |
 
                     (1) 
 
While this is theoretically possible, such a full-field beamsplitter attack requires an extremely complex 
measurement apparatus. For every spatial channel, Eve needs a local oscillator to coherently detect the 
two quadratures of the field, at two orthogonal polarizations, for the two counter propagating fields. These 
can add up to thousands of channels that need to be measured faster than the fluctuation rate of the field. 
Despite of recent advances in the spatial division multiplexing (SDM) in multimode fibres
21
, such a 
measurement is still out of reach of current technology. Furthermore, even if the technology for rapid full-
field characterization will become available in the future, the excess noises induced by Eve’s 
measurements will impose a fundamental limit on the amount of information that she can extract.  
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To analyse the fundamental noise associated with the measurements of Alice, Bob and Eve, we assume 
the laser light is in a coherent state with a large mean photon number. In this limit, Alice and Bob can 
perform a direct intensity measurement which is limited only by shot-noise
22
. Eve, however, needs to first 
coherently detect the field distributions           and         , then compute the intensity   according 
to Eq. (1). Noise is added to her signal at two levels (See Supplementary Section 2). First, for coherent 
states, the standard deviation in the simultaneous measurement of the two field quadratures is √   larger 
than that of a single quadrature measurement
23
. Thus, the standard deviation of the intensity computed 
from the sum of the squares of the quadratures is √  larger than that of a direct, shot-noise limited, 
intensity measurement. A second source of noise in Eve’s reconstruction is the multiplication of fields 
         and          in the right hand side of Eq. (1). Due to error propagation, multiplication of two 
random variables increases the standard deviation of the product by another factor of √ . Thus, if Eve 
detects    photons per channel, her signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is √      whereas the SNR of Alice and 
Bob for a shot-noise limited detection of   photons per channel is √ . We therefore conclude that as 
long as the number of photons per channel that Eve measures is a factor of 4 (6 dB) less than the number 
of photons that Alice or Bob measure, Eve’s SNR will be lower than that of Alice and Bob.  
 
Previous information theoretic security analysis
24
 has proven that the security of key distribution at the 
physical-layer is guaranteed as long as the legitimate users (Alice, Bob) have access to a common source 
of randomness, through channels that are less noisy than the channel of the eavesdropper (Eve). Thus, the 
superior SNR of their measurements enables Alice and Bob to generate a secure key, provided that they 
also have access to an unsecure public channel for privacy amplification protocols. We conduct a 
quantitative analysis based on mutual information, and numerically calculate the secure key fraction (K), 
defined by the ratio of the secure bit rate and the raw bit rate (See Supplementary Section 2 for further 
details). Figure 3(c) plots the secure key fraction K as a function of the reflectivity of Eve’s beamsplitter, 
confirming that as long as Eve measures less than 80% of the photons in the fibre, security is guaranteed. 
Obviously, if Eve takes 80% of the total transmitted power, Alice and Bob would detect her presence. 
Moreover, Eve cannot compensate for the light she removes from the fibre, because for shot-noise limited 
signals, amplification cannot improve the SNR
25
 and Alice and Bob will therefore notice an increase in 
the noise they measure. 
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Finally, we note that thus far we have not considered the fibre transmission loss. Transmission loss 
benefits Eve, since the light she detects experiences less loss than the light which Alice and Bob detect. 
The mutual information analysis illustrates that the optimal position for Eve to place the beam splitter is 
at the midpoint of the fibre. Then, Alice and Bob can establish a secure key only if the transmission from 
the midpoint of the fibre to its ends is higher than -6dB. For typical fibres with transmission loss of 
0.2db/km
26
, this corresponds to a maximum fibre length of 60 km.  
 
Below we briefly discuss a few potential active attacks. An active Eve can try to perform the so-called 
man-in-the-middle attack, where she blocks the light that Alice and Bob send, and couples her own light 
into the fibre. However, by comparing part of the keys they obtain over a public channel, Alice and Bob 
can immediately notice that their keys are no longer correlated, and stop the communication. If Eve tries 
to inject light to the fibre without blocking the light that Alice and Bob send, they can notice a reduction 
in the contrast of the intensity fluctuations they measure. To prevent Eve from inducing correlations by 
modulating the total intensity of the light passing through the fibre, Alice and Bob can measure the total 
intensity that arrives to their end of the fibre, and verify that it is not modulated.  
  
Figure 3. Experimental emulation of a 
direct beamsplitter attack on the 
system shown in figure 1. (a) Eve picks 
up a fraction of the light propagating 
between Alice and Bob by intersecting 
the fibre with beamsplitter. The light 
which arrives to EA and EB passes 
through different parts of the fibre and 
therefore experiences completely 
different mode mixing. (b) The cross-
correlations of measured intensities 
between the speckle grains from the 
four patterns A, B, EA and EB. The 
cross-correlation between A and B 
corresponds to the input modes. Due to 
strong mode mixing, all the speckles in 
patterns EA and EB are equivalent, and 
two of them are selected from EA and 
EB for the other five cross-correlations. 
(c)  Secure key fraction K as a function 
of the beamsplitter reflectivity R, for a 
simulated full-field attack by Eve. For 
R<0.8, a secure key is established.  
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4. Discussion and conclusions 
Our approach to spread the transmitted signal over multiple spatial channels bares similarity with key 
distribution methods in the wireless domain, which rely on the scattering and fading of radio-frequency 
waves
27
. In the optical domain, a recent work demonstrated key distribution by free space propagation 
through turbulent media, but in  this configuration the legitimate users measure the reciprocal phase using 
a complex detection apparatus
28
.  Our scheme is much simpler and more robust as it relies on a direct 
intensity measurement. Compared to the previous key-distribution schemes based on single-mode 
fibres
16,17
, the complexity of the multimode fibre forces the hacker to use a significantly more complex 
detection apparatus and perform additional computational processing. The asymmetry between the 
complex detection of the adversary and the simple direct detection of the legitimate users imposes an 
excess noise in the adversary’s measurements, which the legitimate users can utilize via privacy 
amplification protocols to distil a secure key
29
. 
 
Finally, we further discuss the maximal fibre length. In addition to the 60 km limit due to the transmission 
loss mentioned above, two additional factors affect the fibre length. First, since the fibre has to be static 
during the propagation time, the maximal length depends on the raw key rate. For a raw key rate of 1 KHz 
for example, the maximal fibre length is about 200 km. The second factor is the modal bandwidth , also 
known as the spectral correlation width, which decreases monotonically with the fibre length. The modal 
bandwidth sets the maximal possible frequency mismatch between the lasers of Alice and Bob. The 
typical value of  is about          , which for 200 km long fibres gives       . We note that the 
bandwidth of the lasers,  , can exceed  ; but the contrast of the fluctuations will be reduced by a factor of 
√     If fluctuations on the order of 5% could be used to generate the key, the available optical 
bandwidth for a 200 km fibre would be approximately 1 GHz.  
 
In conclusion, we have developed a key establishment protocol that relies on classical light and off-the-
shelf telecommunication components. We experimentally demonstrate the method using an all-fibre and 
alignment-free system, which is compatible with optical fibre networks. The security of our method relies 
on the complexity of multimode fibres, and on the fundamental noise limits of coherent photodetection. 
While this work has focused on classical light, we notice an analogy between our method and continuous 
variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD), as described in Supplementary Section 2. This analogy may 
allow a future extension  of our security analysis from the specific attack considered here to the more 
general security proofs that were recently developed for CVQKD
30
. The analogy to CVQKD may also 
help developing a new protocol for overcoming the 60 km distance limit discussed above, similar to the 
way CVQKD has been extended beyond the 3dB loss limit using postselection
31
. In addition, spreading 
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quantum light over multiple spatial channels may open new opportunities also for QKD, in the spirit of 
the recent proposals to utilize multiple temporal channels for advanced QKD protocols
32
.  
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Remote Key Establishment by Mode Mixing in Multimode Fibres and Optical 
Reciprocity: Supplementary Information 
 
1. Comparison with other key distribution methods 
Our scheme is inspired by the on-going effort to distribute keys between remote users at the physical-
layer of communication networks. To date, the security of telecommunication networks depends on 
computational security, which is based on unproven assumptions that some computational tasks cannot be 
computed efficiently using a classical computer
S1
. However, an adversary can tap the communication 
channel, save all the encrypted bits, and decrypt the information once a quantum computer, or a new 
computational paradigm, becomes available. In contrast, key distribution at the physical-layer can be 
compromised only if it is hacked in real-time
S2
. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one such physical-
layer approach, which relies on the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics to guarantee that an 
eavesdropper cannot extract the key without being exposed. However, a quantum channel requires 
transmission and detection of quantum states of light, which is technically challenging and expensive, and 
thus has not been widely implemented yet.     
 
Over the years several classical alternatives to QKD have been proposed. A common approach is to rely 
on a pre-established secret information, for example, the parameters of a chaotic laser
S3
, or the 
configuration of the encoder and decoder
S4
. This approach typically requires accurate tuning by the end 
users so that their system parameters will match. More importantly, to guarantee security these settings 
have to be constantly updated, and therefore require an additional key distribution method for securely 
sharing the updated parameters. In an alternative approach, the entire channel between the users is turned 
to a giant fibre laser, with switchable cavity mirrors
S5
.  From the lasing characteristics each user knows 
what mirror was used at the other end of the fibre, and utilize this information to generate a key. 
However, an eavesdropper can directly measure the reflectivity from the mirrors and extract the key, 
since the key is deterministically set by the configuration of the cavity mirrors. It is therefore essential 
that the key will not be determined by the settings of just a few elements, which the adversary can 
measure. Towards this end, it was recently demonstrated that the relative phase between two fluctuating 
single mode fibres can be used for generating a key
S6
. Since the phase difference between the two fibres is 
accumulated along the entire length of the fibres, it is significantly more challenging for an eavesdropper 
to measure.  Nevertheless, by splitting each fibre and measuring the phase accumulated at each of the four 
segments, the eavesdropper can compute the total phase difference between the fibres and extract the 
key
S6
. In our multimode fibre configuration, an equivalent attack would require coherent detection of 
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hundreds of spatial channels, simultaneously, featuring the complexity of multimode fibres.  It forces the 
adversary to use a significantly more complex detection apparatus than the apertures of the legitimate 
users, and additional computational processing, which as we further discuss in the next section, sets the 
security of the key. 
 
2. Security analysis of full-field attack 
The fact that some information can leak to the eavesdropper is common to all physical-layer key 
distribution methods, including quantum key distribution
S7
. Nevertheless, security of the key can still be 
guaranteed provided that the amount of information that has leaked is smaller than the amount of 
information that is exchanged between the legitimate users, by processing the raw signals using privacy 
amplification protocols
S8
. The analysis of physical-layer systems is therefore based on notions from 
information theory that quantify the amount of information between the users. A central result in 
information theoretic security was derived by Csiszar and Korner
S9
, who proved that the security of key 
distribution at the physical-layer is guaranteed as long as the legitimate users have access to a common 
source of randomness, through channels that are less noisy than the channel of the eavesdropper. Thus, 
we next perform a noise analysis of the full-field attack. 
 
Noise analysis of the full-field attack 
In this section we compare the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the intensity reconstructed by Eve, with the 
SNR of the intensity measured by Alice and Bob. Let us denote by    (    the projection of the 
complex field          (        ), that gets from Alice (Bob) to Eve, onto the output channel  
     . Here   denotes the output spatial and polarization channels at Eve's beamsplitter, and    is the 
number of spatial channels the fibre supports. From Eq. (1) in the main text, Eve can reconstruct the 
intensity that is measured by Alice and Bob, by computing the intensity   |∑      |
 . The signal 
reconstructed by Eve, however, will have an additional noise that originates from the noise in her 
measurements. We model the noise in the quadratures of each of the channels she measures by additive, 
uncorrelated, Gaussian random variables, with a variance      By plugging the random variables into the 
sum Eve computes and averaging over the noise  realizations, we get the signal to noise ratio (SNR) of 
Eve’s reconstructed intensity: 
 
     √
    
           
,     (S1) 
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where         is the number of photons that get to Eve from Alice (Bob), and we assumed the high SNR 
limit        
  . Assuming that Alice and Bob send the same number of photons per bit,   , then the 
average number of photos that arrive to Eve is        
          and        
         ,   is the 
fiber attenuation coefficient,   is the fiber length,   is the distance of Eve's beamsplitter from the fiber 
midpoint, and   is the reflectivity of the beamsplitter. We thus get: 
     √
        
⁄
    
 
         
.    (S2) 
 
To maximize her SNR, Eve needs to place her beamsplitter at the midpoint of the fibre (z=0). The SNR is 
then given by: 
 
     √
  
   
,     (S3) 
where        
    ⁄      is the average number of photons per channel that get to Eve. For 
computing the fundamental limit on Eve’s SNR, we need to evaluate the variance of the noise in the 
measurement of the two quadratures of the field. According to the quantum theory of photodetection, the 
fundamental noise associated with coherent detection of the two quadratures of a coherent state 
simultaneously is Gaussian noise with       , and therefore      √    . In contrast to Eve, 
Alice and Bob can perform a direct shot noise limited intensity measurement, and therefore their SNR is 
giving by        √ , where           
    ⁄    . We therefore conclude that as long as the 
number of photons per channel that Eve measures is a factor of 4 less than the number of photons that 
Alice or Bob measure, Eve’s SNR will be lower than that of Alice and Bob.  
 
Mutual information analysis 
The noise in the signal reconstructed by Eve intuitively limits the amount of information she can extract.  
To obtain a quantitative relation between the amount of information obtained by Eve and the security of 
the key, we use the result of Csiszar and Korner, who proved that the key fraction, defined by the ratio of 
the secret key and the raw bit rate, is given by
S9
: 
 
            [             ]      (S3) 
 
Here        is the mutual information between Alice and Bob, and        (      ) is the mutual 
information between Eve and Alice (Bob).  
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To study the effect of the excess noise on the key fraction, we performed a numerical simulation of Eve’s 
attack and computed the mutual information of the simulated signals measured by Alice, Bob and Eve. 
The channel projections of the complex fields at Eve’s output channel,    and    , are simulated by 
circular complex Gaussian random numbers, and the intensity at the output channel of Alice and Bob is 
computed using    |∑      |
 .  We next simulated Eve’s noisy measurements by adding a Gaussian 
noise to the real and imaginary part of the complex fields    and    with variance  
     , and 
computed Eve’s noisy intensity. The noisy measurement of Alice and Bob are simulated by a Poissonian 
random number with mean   . We repeat this procedure for 10
6
 realizations of the fibre configuration (i.e. 
10
6
 realizations of    and    ). Finally, we compute the mutual information between the simulated 
intensities of Alice, Bob and Eve, and using Eq. (S3) we obtain the secret key fraction K.  
 
Figure S1 depicts the key fraction ( ) as a function of the reflectivity of Eve’s beam splitter, for different 
average numbers of photons per channel. As long as Eve measures less than 80% of the photons in the 
fibre, security is guaranteed. The 80% limit corresponds to the above observation that Eve needs to detect 
at least 6db more photons per channel than Alice and Bob, in order to hack the key. Obviously, if Eve 
tries to take 80% of the power, Alice and Bob will detect her presence. Moreover, she cannot compensate 
for the loss that Alice and Bob will experience, because for shot-noise limited signals, amplification 
cannot increase the SNR
S10
. Alice and Bob will therefore notice an increase in the noise they measure, 
and a reduction in their mutual information.  
 
 
Figure S1. Numerical simulation of the secure key fraction K as a function of the reflectivity of Eve’s beamsplitter, 
for different values of average number of photons per channel. Security is guaranteed for K>0, which is obtained for 
R<0.8.  
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Analogy to continuous variable quantum key distribution 
Finally, we note that in this work we focused on analysing passive beam splitter attack. A promising route 
to extend the security analysis to more general attacks is via the analogy between our method and 
continuous variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD). In CVQKD Alice encodes a random key in the 
amplitude and phase of a coherent state using modulators, and sends it to Bob, who measures the two 
quadrature of the field using coherent detection
S11,S12
. Conceptually, one can think of our multimode fibre 
as the amplitude and phase modulator, which one of the users, say Alice, uses to send a random coherent 
state to Bob. Since Alice does not know the modulation which the multimode fibre has applied, she 
receives that information from the light Bob sends her. We encoded the key by the intensity measured by 
Alice and Bob, but similarly to CVQKD, the key can also be encoded by the quadratures of the fields. 
This analogy may allow a future extension  of our security analysis, from the specific attack we 
considered here, to the more general security proofs that were recently developed for CVQKD
S13
.  
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